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NOTE AND COMMENT
BovcoTT-CLA.YTON AcT.-In Duple~ Printing Press Company v. Deering
et al. (January 3, 1921)~ 41 S. Ct. 172, the facts were:
The plaintiff, a Michigan corporation, manufactures at Battle Creek, and
sells throughout the United States, especially in and around New York City,
and abroad, very large, heayy and complicated newspaper printing presses.
Purchasers furnish workmen, but ordinary mechanics alone are not competent to do this, and so they are supervised! by specially skilled imchinists
furnished by plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have ·always operated on the "open
shop" plan, without discrimination against union .or non-union labor, either
at its factory or at the place of installation of presses, but have not observed
the eight-hour day nor the union scale of wages.
Defendants are members of the International Association of Machinists,
and are sued individually and in various representative capacities. This association is unincorporated, with a membership of over sixty thousand in various districts and local unions throughout the United States. D and B are
sued indiviqually and as representatives of unincorporated District No. 15,
composed of six local lodges of the association in New York City. N is
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sued individually and as agent of unincorporated local lodge 328, of this
district. Another N is sued individually and as agent of the unincorporated
Riggers' Protective Union of workingmen engaged in handling', hauling and
erecting machinery, with jurisdiction over a11 union men in that business in
New York City.
It was also alleged that both the union machinists and union riggers
were so affiliated with the Building Trades Council of New York City,
including thirty different trades and over seventy-five thousand members,
no oRe of which was allowed to work in or on a building where a non-union
man was employed ; that it was practically impossible to erect any building
in New York where any non-union man was employed; that the whole
machinery of the council would be put in operation to prevent plaintiff from
exhibiting its presses at a pending exposition; that the Association of
Machinists and its branches were combining and conspiring to monopolize
the machinist's trade throughout the United States, and prevent the employment of any machinist who was not a member by any employer unless be
would operate a closed shop and employ only machinists who were members of the union.
No one of the defendants is, or ever was, an employee of the plaintiff,
nor a ~mber or representative of any lodge or union not local to New
York City.
The suit was to enjoin an alleged conspiracy by the defendants to restrain
plaintiff's interstate commerce in printing presses, contrary to the common
law and to the Sherman Anti-trust Act. It was begun before, but not beard
until two years after, the Clayton Act was passed, the provisions of which
were invoked by both parties.
Between 1909 and 1913 aU of plaintiff's competitors had recognized and
dealt with the Machinists' Union and conformed to its reque!lts, but the
plaintiff steadfastly refused. In 1913 two of these competitors notified the
Union they should be obliged to terminate their agreements with it unless
the plaintiff would accede to the union requirements. Because plaintiff
refused to do this, eight months before suit was brought, the International
Association of Machinists, with a view to compelling plaintiff to unionize its
factory, enforce the "closed shop," adopt the eight-hour· day and the union
scale of wages, called a. strike' at plaintiff's factory. Only fourteen union
machinists, including three who supervised the erection of presses by plaintiff's customers, left. This did not materia11y interfere with plaintiff's business and is not complained of in the suit.
The acts complained of relate solely to the interference with the installation and operation of presses by plaintiff's customers, by an elaborate,
country-wide programme, adopted and carried out by the defendants and
their organizations, to boycott plaintiff's products; by warning Ct1Stom«s
~t to purchase, or, if purchased, not to install presses; by threatening them.
if they did, with loss by strikes of their employees and sympathetic strikes
in other trade5; by notifying a trucking company not to haul presses, and
threatening to incite their employees to strike if they did; by notifying
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repair shops not to repair presses mad:e by plaintiffs; by threatening union
me" with loss of union cards and being blacklisted as "scabs" if ·they helped
install presses; by threatening an exposition company with a strike if it permitted plaintiff's presses to be exhibited; and, generally, by injuring and
threatening to injure in various ways plaintiff's customers and prospective
customers, and persons handling, hauling or installing the presses.
A typical illustration of the acts complained of is: The Italian Herald
purchased a press; defendant D got to the Herald office before the press
did; he told the Herald it had no right to purchase the press, and "we will
make trouble as soon as it arrives"; this was made as promised; the trucking
company was told to handle no more after that was delivered and it stopped;
the owner of the building, then under construction, was told the union workmen on the building would be called off on a strike, and the completion of
the building would be delayed, if the installation of the press by the Herald
was not stopped. This was done until Saturday afternoon, night, and Sunday, when installation was completed while the union workmen were not at
work on the building. Another illustration: Plaintiff sold a press to N in
New York City. Y, a member of the Machinists' Union, was to supervise
its installation.; defendant D asked Y if he sided with the union or with the
plaintiff; he replied he sided with the plaintiff, whereupon D said he wou!d
take his union card away from him and blacklist him as a "scab" all over
the East. D then followed Y down to the office of the trucking company,
where he told the truckman not to haul the machinery; it would make trouble
for him if he did; the truckman accordingly refused. No actual violence
was used or threatened, although some occurred which was not definitely
connected with the defendants.
Manton, J., in the district court, after reviewing the testimony, says:
"A careful reading of the entire record leads to the concltlsion Jthat if men
have a right to strike and to endeavor to prevail upon others to fail to
work for their employer, this is such a case as exemplifies careful, prudent,
arut lawful conduct on the part of employees. There is nothing in this record
which warrants my granting the injunction."
On the other hand, Rogers, J., in the Circuit Court of Appeals, said the
union men had been coerced by threats of taking away their cards and blacklis~ing them as "scabs" ; customers have been intimidated by threats to call
out men engaged in other trades or on uncompleted buildings; presses were
not to be repaired, and threats to put them out of order were made; in one
case defendants tried to obtain the cancellation of one of plaintiff's contracts.
These are fair illustrations of the different views persons-judges as
well as others-take of the same facts in labor controversies. Some think
the acts commendable; others think them criminal. See especially the variety
of the views taken by the judges in the case of Allen v. Flood.'
Judge Manton of the district court held that under the common law of
SAllen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1;

i
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New York, where the suit was brought, the secondary boycott was lawful
if not accompanied by malice, violence, or fraud,' and that there was . no
irreparable injury to any property right permitting an injunction under the
Clayton Act.•
·
Hough, C. ]., and Hand, D. ]., in the Circuit Court of. Appeals, held the
acts were lawful under the Clayton Act; but Rogers, C. ]., dissented. Hough
and Rogers, C.
held that by the common law of New York a secondary
boycott was valid .under the decisions referred to; but Rog~rs, C. J., claimed
these only applied to a general boycott of all non-union mills and non-unionmade materials, and not to a general boycott of a particular manufacturer
for maintaining a closed shop, when others doing the same in the same
industry were not so molested. Such was a malicious destruction of the
good will of business of such manufacturers, and was not lawful in New
York; and by the weight of authority elsewhere the boycott is unlawful.'
Hough and Rogers, C. JJ., both were certain that the defendants ''have agreed
to do and attempted performance of the very thing pronounced unlawful
under the Sherman Act by the Supreme Court before the Clayton Act."'
Manton, J., quoting from a former opinion of Hough, C. ]., sa:vs: "I
ao not see any distinction which should make a legal difference between a
lockout, a strike, and a boycott; all are voluntary abstentions from acts
which normal persons usually perform for mutual benefits: in all, the reason
for abstention is a determination to conquer by proving the endurance of
the attack will outlast the resistance of the defense. For all, the New York
law provides the same test: (I) Is the object legal? (2) Are the means used
lawful?"
Rogers, C. J., however, says:' "A strike a~d a boycott arc two quite distinct matters. A strike is an effort on the part of employees to obtain higher
wages, or shorter hours, or a closed shop by stopping work at a preconcerted
time. It is an attack made by employees upon their employer, by labor upon
capital. But a boycott made by union labor against a product manufactured
by non-union labor is an attack upon both labor and capital. It is the union
employees on one side and. non-union employees and the open shop employer
on the other. The principles applicable to a boycott are not applicable to a
strike. The strike in Battle Creek may be lawful, while the boycott of the
product in New ·York may be unlawful. The use of the· boycott is very
generally held to be the use of unlawful means, and it is not material, where

n.,

0 Bossert v. Dhuy {t!117), 221 N. Y. 342; Gill 8c Co. v. Doerr (D. C.), 214 Fed. 1u.
•Oct. 15, 1914, C. 323, f 20, 38 ST. L. 738; CoKP. ST. 1916, I 1243d.
•Citing State v. Stockford (1904), 77 Conn. 227; Purvis v. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters (1906), 214 Pa. 348; State v. Stewart (1887), 59 Vt. 273; Wilson v. Hen17
(1908), 232 Ill. 389; Beck v. Railway 8c Union (1898), u8 Mich. 497; Quinn v. Leatbem,
[t901] A. C. 495.
•Loewe v. Lawlor (1908), 208 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 3c1; Lawlor v. Loewe (1914),
235 U. S. 522, 35 S. Ct. 17b.
•Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr (C. C. l!>t4), 214 Fed. 111.
• 252 Fed. 733.
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it is resorted to, whether the end sought-in this case the unionizing of the
shops in Michigan-is lawful or not."
These statements are also typical of the difference among judges as to
the legal aspects of labor controversies.
Both the District Court' and the Circuit Court of Appeals' held the Clayton Act forbade an injunction, although, but for that act, one should have
been granted. The Supreme Court reversed this, .Mr. Justice Pitney delivering the opinion for the majority, Mr. Justice Brandeis delivering a dissenting opinion concurred in by Holmes and Clarke, JJ.
All agreed that the lower courts were right in giving effect to the Clayto~ Act, but they dis.agreed as to whether the proper effect was given.
Justice Pitney held that Section 16 of the Clayton Act gave a private
relief by injunction for threatened loss by a violation. of the anti-trust laws,
which a private party did not have before ;10 that, by Section I of that act, the
Sherman Act was defined as an anti-trust law; that plaintiff's right to manufacture and sell presses in commerce is a property right; that unrestrained access
to the channels of interstate commerce is necessary to its success; that the
facts showed a widespread combination by defendants to obstruct this, resulting in substantial damage and threatening irreparable loss; that by the
Sherman Act every conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
states is illegal;. that a conspiracy ·is a combination to accomplish an unlawful purpos.e, or a lawful purpose by unlawful means ;11 that the substance of
the matters compl;iined of constitute a .secondary boycott-i e., a combination
not merely to refrain, or peacefully to advise or persuade plaintiff's customers
to refrain, from dealing with it ("primary boycott"), but to exercise coercive
pressure upon such customers, actual or ptospective, in order to cause them
to withhold or withdraw patronage from plaintiff through fear of loss to
themselves if they deal with it; that the distinction between . primary and
secondary boycott is material in the proper construction of the Clayton Act,
but it is only of minor importance whether either is unlawfu1 at commou
law in determining the right to· an injunction under the Sherman Act; that
by the decisions under this act peaceable persuasion is as much prohibited
as force or threats of force, and is not justified even if the participants have
some object beneficial to themselves or their associates."
The majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals held that under Section
ao, in conjunction with Section 6 of the Clayton A<:t, no injunction could be
.granted. Section 6 provides: "The labor of a human being is not a com•Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering (D. C., r9r7), 247 Fed. r92.
1 Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering (C. C. A., r918), 252 Fed. 722.
u Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal (I917), 244 U. S. 459, 471.
11 Pettibone v. United States (1892), 148 U. S. 197, 203. Thiis is the usual definition
ever since Tise r .. 1nuom.en·s Case, in 1664, cited in King v. Joumcynian Tailors (r721),
8 Mod. n,320, and King v. Starling, l Keb. 650, 655, 675, I Sid. 174, pl. 6, 83 Eng. R.
1164, 1167, 3 Cor.. L. R:r;v. 447 (1903).
DLoewe v. Lawlor"(1908), 208 U.S. 274; Eancrn States Lumber Asso..... United
States (1914), 23i U. S. 600; Lawlor v. Loewe (1915), 235 U. S. 522, 534.
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modity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws
shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor organi:rations,
instituted for the purposes of mutual help * * * or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof,
be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint
of trade under the- anti-trust laws."
This only declares that nothing in the anti-trust acts shall be construed
to forbid labor organizations or their members from law{ully carrying out
their legitimate objects, and does not authorize any unlawful activity or illegal
conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Section 20 provides: "No injunction shall be granted * * * in any case
between an employer and employees * * * involving or growing out of a
dispute concerning terms or r.onditions of employment, unless necessary to
prevent irreparable injury to property or to a property right. * * * And no
such injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, singly or in concert,
from· terminating any relation of employment or from ceasing to perform
any work or labor or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; from
peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working; or from
ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; * * * or from doing
any act or thing which might lawfully be done. in the absence of such dispute
by any party thereto."
All of the judges, in all the courts, agreed that the acts of the defendants
amounted to a secondary boycott, of a coercive but not violent character.
The controversy was as to the meaning of the ''blindly drawn" provisions
of the Clayton Act, and especially of the words "employers," and "employees,''
and "others," in Section 20. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that "employers" and "employees," as used in Section 20, referred to the business clizss,
to which the litigants belonged; and that the union and each of its sixty
thousand members, although no one of them had ever been employed by the
plaintiffs, having first created a labor disturbance by calling a strike at plain:tiff'~ factory, thereaiter had such an interest in the matter as to justify the
union in calling strikes of the employees of other employers, between whom
there was no dispute, and which employers had no business relatione with
plaintiff except by purchasing pfcsses in the ordinary course of interstate
commerce.
Mr. Justice Pitney says: "We deem this construction altogether inadmissible." The act imposes an extraordinary restriction on the equity powers
of courts in the nature of a special privilege to a particular class; it would
violate all the ordinary rules of construction to extend the privilege by
loose construction beyond those who are proximately and substantially, not
merely sympathetically, interested in "a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment"; Congress had in mind particular disputes, not a class
war ; labor organizations are not mentioned in Section 20, and to extend a
dispute directly affecting a few actual employees to all th .. members of the
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union would so eniarge the meaning as to be inconsistent with Section 6,
.which limits activity to lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof;
"ceasing to patronize" is limited to pressure on a "party to such dispute," by
"peaceful and lawful" influence on neutrals, not by threats of strikes of theit·
employees, to compel withdrawal of patronage of plaintiff to· induce him to
yield.
Justi~e Pitney in SUPP.Ort of this view quoted from the explanatory statements made by the spokesman of the House of Representatives Judiciary
Committee, who had charge of the bill when it was under consideration, such
being a proper aid in ascertaining the legislative intent," as to the meaning
cf Section 20. This was unequivocally to the effect that the section "was
carefully prepared with the settled purpose of excluding the secondary boycott; it was the opinion of the committees that it did not legalize it; it was
not their purpose to authorize it, and not a member of the committee would
vote to do so." By the construction given by the court below, an ordinary
labor controversy in a manufacturing establishment justifies a nation-wide
ock:tde of interstate commerce in its products by sympathetic strikes and
boycotts against its customers, to the incalculable damage of innocent people
remote from, unconnected with, and having no control over the actual dispute, constituting the general public, and having a vital interest in unobstructed commerce, which the anti-trust acts were to protect.
Plaintiff has a clear right to an injunction under the Sherman Act as
amended b!r the Clayton Act, and it is unnecessary to consider what the
result :would be under the common law or local statutes.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, says as to the common law: Defendants'
justification is self-interest; they support the strike at the factory by a strike
elsewhere against its product, not maliciously but in self-defense; plaintiff's
refusal to deal with the union and observe its standards threatened not only
the interests of its members at the factory but even more of all the affiliated unions employed by plaintiff's competitors, whose more advanced standards plaintiff was, in reality, attacking; the contest between the plaintiff and
the union involves vitally the interest of every person whcse cooperation is
sought. May not all with a common interest join in refusing ·to labor on
articles whose very production constitutes an attack upon this standard of
living and the institution which supports it? Yes, by common law principles,
if. in fact they have a common interest. At first strikes were held illegal."
Later, the obvious self-interest of the laborer in the improvement of his
wages, hours and conditions of work constituted a justification."' Then some
courts held the mutual interest of members of a union, in the union, was not
suflicient self-interest to justify a strike to force the unionizati~n of the
"Binns"· U. S. (1904), 194 lJ: S. 486, 495; Pennsylva1iia R. R. Co. v. International
Coal Co. (1913), 230 U. S. 184, 198; Uni•ed States v. Coco Cola Co. (1916). 241 U. S.
265, 281; U. S. v. St. Paul Ry. Co. (1918), ;z47 U. S. JIO, 318.
,. Co1n1oxs, H1sT. ov LABOR, Vol. 2, Ch. 5.
"'Pickett "· Walsh (1906), 192 Mass. 572.
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shop.'' Other courts, viewing the same facts differently, held otherwise."
Later, when centralization of business brought corresponding centralization
in labor organizations, a single employer might, as here, threaten the standards of the whole organization, and then. naturalYy ~Q.e union would protect
itself by refusing to work on his materials wherever found; here again some
courts held the intervention of the purchaser broke the direct relation between
employer and employee, and a strike against the materials was a str!ke
against the purchaser by unaffected third parties.11 Other courts, better appre~
ciating the facts of industry, recognized the unity of interest throughout the
union, and in refusing to work on such materials the union was only refusing
to aid in destroying itself.11 On the question of. fact, I would say, as the
lower courts said, the defendants and those from whom they sought cooperation had a common interest, and. under the common law of New York the
plaintiff had no caus·e of action."'
The Clayton Act was the result of twenty years' agitation to equalize
before the law the position of the employer and employee, as industrial combatants. The chief sources of dissatisfaction were the use of the injunction
and the doctrine of "malicious combination" ; this made an act otherwise
damnum absque injuria, as a result of trade competition, actionable as malicious, if done for a purpose the judge co.nsldered socially or economically
·harmful. Great confusion existed among the judges as to what purposes
were lawful and what unlawful. By I9I4. it was thought Congress, and not
the judges, should declare how the inequality and, uncertainty of the law
should be removed and what damages could be inflicted on art employer in
an economic struggle without liability, instead of leaving the judges to determine this according to their own economic and social views. This was the
idea presented by the committees reporting the Clayton Act. Certain acts
committed in the course of an industrial dispute, and which before were
declared unlawful whenever the courts disapproved the ends for which they
were performed, were declared not to violate any law_ of the United States;
that is, the opinion of Congress as to the propriety of the purpose was substituted for that of differing judges; that relations between employers and
workingmen were competitive; that organized competition was not harmful,
and that it justified injuries necessarily inflicted in its course. The minority
and majority reports of the house committee indicated such to be the pur11 Plant v. Woods (1900), 176 Mass. 492; Lucke v. Clothing Cutters (1893), 77 M<1.
J96; Erdman v. Mitchell (1903), 207 Pa. St. 79.
"National Protective Assn. v. Cumming (1902), 170 N. Y. 315; Kemp v. Division
N'>. 241 (1912), 255 Ill. 213: Roddy v. United Mine Workers (1914), 41 Okla. 621.
11
Burnham v. Dowd (1914). 217 Ma.•s. 351; Purvis v. Unit~d Brotherhood (1906),
a14 Pa. St. 348; Booth v. Burgess (1906), 72 N. ]. Eq. 181.
u Bossert v. Dhuy (1917), 221 N. Y. 342; Coh·n {\: Roth Elect. Co. v. Bri~lclayers
(1917), 92 Conn. 161: State v. Van Pelt (1904), 136 N. C. 633; Grant Construction Co.
Y. St. Paul Building Trades (1917), 136 Minp. 167; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union (1909)~
156 Cal. 70 1 76.
•Bossert Y. Dhuy (1917), a21 N. Y. 342; Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardwell (1919),
a27 N. Y. 1. Compare Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal '(1917). 244 U. S. 459, 471.
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pose. If the act applies to this case, then the acts cannot violate "any law
of the United States, and so not the Sherman Act." Congress did not restrict
the provisions to employers and workmen in their employ. By including
"employers and employees,'' and "persons employed md seeking employment,''
it showed that it was not merely aiming at a legal relationship between a
specific employer and his employees. The contention that this case is net
one arisi~g out of a dispute concerning the conditions of work of one of the
parties is . founded on a misconception of the facts.
Judge Brandeis adds that, because he concluded that both the common
law of a state and a statute of the United States declare the right of industrial combatants to push their struggle to the limits of the justification of
self-interest, "I do not wish to be understood as attaching any constitutional
or moral sanction to the right. * * * Above all rights rises duty to the community. The conditions of industry may be such that those engaged in it
cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community. It is not
for the judges to determine whether such conditions exist, nor their function
to set the limits of permissible contest. This is the function of the legislature."
One can hardly refrain from the remark, from the variety of views of
the judges who pronounced opinions in this case, that it is about as easy for
courts to determine what justice demands under certain conditions as to
determine the meaning of an act of Congress. It would seem that Justice
Pitney's quotations from the statements made in the Jtouse at the time of
the report of the Judiciary Committee are the best evidence of what that
committee meant to do and thought it had done, and that was to exclude
~e secondary boycott from the things declared to be lawful. Soon after the
Clayton Act was passed similar acts were passed in several states.11 The
interpretation of many of these has often accorded with the majority opinion
in this ca~e.u
There is no doubt that there has been the trend and confusion in judicial
decisions indicated by Justice Brandeis, and many more cases could be cited.
So, too, there is no doubt that the common law ot New York'is as pointed
out by him; and scarcely any doubt that the weight of authority elsewhere
is otherwise, as indicated by Judge Rogers. Scarcely any English cases were
cited. From the time when John Mewic would not let Matilda's tenants till
her land in 1200,• and the bailiffs of Shrewsbury proclaimed no one in the
town should sell merchandise to the Abbott of Litleshull in,1225,"' to Quinn
v. Leathem• and Pratt v. Medical Association,• boycotting has been unlawful
in the English law, although it did not get its name until about l88o, when
Captain Boycott, representing Lord Earne, in Connemara, Ireland, gave notice
to the lord's tenants to vacate, whereupon the people for miles around
21 See 20 CoL. L. R&v. (June, 1920), p. 696.
nJl>id., p. 697.
•SELECT CIVIL PLEAS, Vol. I, p. 3, pl 7, 3 Selden Society.
"SELECT PLEAS OF THE CzcwN, Vol. l, p. 115, p. 178, 1 Selden Society.
• [1901] A. C. 495.
• [1919] I K. B. 244, 18 MICH L. REV. 148 (Dec., 1919).
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resolved to have nothing to do with him, nor allow anyone else to; so his
laborers fled, he got no food, and no one woqld speak to him, until the Ulsterites came to his rescue, and civil war followed, which the government had
to put down by the soldiers.21 There is also no doubt that, under the Slrerman Act and the decisions of the Supreme· Court before the Clayton Act, the
defendants' acts were illegal.
H. L. W.
DISQUALIFICATION ol' JunGts BY PREJUDICE.-Under the provmons "of
Section 2I of the Federal Judicial Code, Victor Berger and others, who had
been indicted under the Espionage Act in the Northern District of Illinois,
filed an affidavit charging Judge Landis with personal bias and prejudice
against them as German-Americans, and moved for the assignment of another
judge to preside at their trial. The motion was overruled by Judge· Landis,
and he himself presided at the trial, and the defendants were convicted and
sentenced. The Supreme Court of the United States, to which the matter
came on certificate, held, three justices dissenting, that Judge Landis could
not, under the statute, pass upon the truth of the facts alleged in the affidavit
showing prejudice, but thaU, upon the filing of an affidavit sufficient on its
face, he was incapacitated from further proceeding with the case. Berger v.
United States, No. 46o, decided January 3I, 1921.
This decision seems in harmony with the evident purpose of the statute,
and is reassuring to all who feel that the courts cannot too strictly guard
themselves from any suspicion of hostility or favoritism toward litigants.
The common law was probably too indifferent on this matter. Blackstone
says that "in the times of Bracton and Fleta, a judge might be refused for
good cause; but now the law is otherwise, and it is held that judges and
justices cannot be challanged." 3 CoMKENTARn:S, 362. But the obviously
just rule that a man cannot be judge in his own case, now universally recognized, would seem to extend itself in principle over every suit where a judge,
by reason of prejudice and the consequent partisan interest which he develops, has made himself morally a party to the action. The section of the
Federal Judicial Code on which the objection to Judge Landis was bastd
undertook to put this principle into operation. Upon the filing .of the affidavit
Judge Landis undoubtedly became a party to a controversy over his own fitness, and he insisted on deciding the merits of the case in which he was a
contestant. The Supreme Court thought him qualified to decide the legal
sufficiency of the showing made, but not to pass upon the truth of the accusation.
Under a somewhat similar statute in Montana it has been held that the
filing of a proper disqualification affidavit ipso facto deprives the judge of
further authority to act. State ex rel. v. Clancy, 30 Mont. 529; State ex rel.
v. Donlan, 32 Mont. 256. Under the California statute a similar result follows in justice court cases, People v. Flagley, 22 Cal. 34. and in superior
court cases where no counter affidavits are filed, People v. Compton, 123 Cal.
21 I.Aw AS TO BOYCOTT, WYMAK (1903), 15

Green Bag, 20S-:n5.
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403. The "salutary rule" of relieving the judge from the "very delicate and
trying duty of deciding upon the question of his own disqualification" received
,the warm approval of the California court in the case last cited.
The Berger case effectually disaffirms the doctrine of Ex pa.rte N. K.
Fairbanks Co., I94 Fed. 978, where Judge Jones, in the Middle District of
Alabama, held, in a long and elaborate opinion, that Congrr.ss could not,
under the Constitution, "lawfully enact that a judge, who is in truth qualified,
is in law disqualified because a suitor makes an affidavit to that effect, and
make that ex Parle statement conclusive proof of the disqualification and cut
off all judicial inquiry as to the judge's competency." He contended that
the disqualification of a judge to try a particular case must rest upon facts
which unfit him, and the existence of such facts must be determined as a
judicial question by some judicial tribunal; that if the filing of the requisite
affidavit operated to pr~vent the judge from further acting in the litigation
we should have a situation where "the affidavit maker in fact, though not in
name, puts on the judicial robes and excludes the presiding judge and all
other judicial authority from any voice in determining the -matter, :md by
the mere filing of an affidavit renders judgment of disqualification and executes it," citing Mabry v. Baxter, II Heisk. (Tenn.) 689, li!>I, and' Sanders v.
Cabanni.ss, 43 Ala. I73, in condemnation of such a procedure as an illegal
assumption by the legislature of judicial power.
Although two dissenting opinions were filed in the Berger case, written
by Justices Day and McReynolds, neither of them suggests that the construction of the statute given by the majority of the court involves any unconstitutional interference with the judicial power vested in the courts.
E. R.S.
ACCIDENT IN WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATION.-The interpretation of workmen's:-compensation statutes has caused the courts a great deal of difficulty.
The usual statute provides for compensation for an "accident arising out of
and in the course of the employment." Such a type of statute has made it
necessary for the courts to inquire into what constitutes an accident, what
is an accident arising out of the employment, and what is an accident arising
in the course of the employment. Each one of these inquiries has been the
source of much litigation, and it has now become fairly well settled as to
what accident "arises out of and in the course of the employment." See I2
MICH. L. REv. 6I4, 688; I4 MICH. :r.,., REV. 525; I5 MICH. L. REv. 92, 15o6; I6
MICH. L. REv. I79. 462; I8 MICH. L. REv. 72, I62. The question as to what
constitutes an accident is still the subject of many varied decisions. The
problem was involved in the recent case of Prouse v. Indust1'ial Commission
(Colo., 1920), I94 Pac. 625, where the court (two judges dissenting) held
that a coal miner was not injured by accident where a germ i:lisease had
proved fatal because he had become weakened hy foul air and dioxide gas
which came from an inclosed entry that the miners had broken into.
One of the. principal reasons for the variety of decisions in regard to
the word "accident" is that the word is used in many different senses, and
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there are times when a liberal interpretation. is called for and others where
a strict construction is demanded. The courts, in interpreting accident insurance policies, generally hold that if the death is caused by a previously diseased
conditian of the body, without which the death would not have followed
the injury, it is not an.accidental death. National Masonic Assn. v. Shyrock,
73 Fed. 774- In workmen's compensation cases, however, it is generally held
that anything contributing directly or indirectly to incapacity following an
injury is suffiCient within the compensation lawlj. Indian Creek Mining Co.
v. Calvert, II9 N. E. (Ind. App.) 519; Robbins v. Gas Engine Co., 191 Mich.
122.

A disease contracted by gradual process, commonly known as an industrial or occupational disease, is not an accident within the compensation
laws. Liondale Bleach, Dye and Paint Works v. Riker, 85 N. J. L. ¢ ;
Adams v. Acme 1-Vhite l.ead and Color Works, 182 Mich. 157; Paton v. Dixon,
[1913] 6 B: W. C. C. 882; Evans v. Wood, [1912] 5 B. W. C. C. 305. The
usual reasoning of the courts is that an accident m·:st have definite time,
place, and circumstances. Other courts take the view that the important
characteristics of an accident are that the injury be unexpected and unintentional. Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Commission, 177 Cal. 614; Indian Creek
Mining Co. v. Calvert, supra. These two lines of reasoning show that the
courts which adhere to the first view adopt the layman's interpretation of
an accident, while the others have used the. word in a special legal sense.
Under either line of reasoning, a man slowly acquiring lead poisoning while
working in a mine is not injured by accident; but should there be a caving-in
of a wall which held back poisonous fumes, and the workman should, as a
consequence, acquire lead poisoning suddenly, there would be an injury by
accident.
The situation of the English law is, at present, in this position. Where
a workman gradually contracted eczema while employed at dipping rings in
a chemical, it was held not to be an accident. Evans v. Wood, supra. But
recovery was allowed in Alloa Coal Co. v. Drylie, [1913] Sess. Cases 549,
where a water pump burst and the workman died from pneumonia (a germ
disease) contracted from standing in the cold water. In the case last cited,
Lord Dundas delivering the majority opinion, said that the disease was
attributable to some particular event or occurrence of an unusual and unex:.
pected character incidental to the employment, and could fairly be termed
an accident. Lord Salverson, rendering a dissent in the same case, .said that
if the deceased's legs had become inflamed from standing in the cold water,
or if the water had been corrosive in its character, there would have been
an injury by accident. This English case and the recent Colorado case are
similar in that the workman in each case died from a germ disease resulting
from his weakened condition. The cases are, however, by no means analogous and the facts are sufficiently different to warrant opposite results.
Poor air in a mine is to be expected, but the bursting of a \\·ater pipe is
unexpected; and- if the English court were to decide the Colorado case and
were to apply the reasoning used in the Alloa Coal Co. case, it would in :ill
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probability reach the same conclusion that the majority reached in the Colorado case.
The situation in the Wisconsin court is much the same as that in England. In Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., I6x Wis. 370, it was held that
a laborer contracting typhoid fever by <irmking impure water was injured
by accident because the affliction was attributed to the undesigned and unexpected presence of bacteria in the drinking water. The principal difference
between the majority and the dissenting opinions seems to be that the latter
emphasized the fact that no external violence occurred. • The Wisconsin
Industrial Commission has held that a gradually acquired occupational disease is not an accidental injury within the meaning of the act. Derkindern
v. Rundle Mfg. Co., Rep. Wis. Indus. Comm. (I9I4-15) 16.
The California court expressed the reason for the many conflicting views
on the subject when it said that in workmen's compensation cases it gave
the phrase ".sustained by accident" a broad construction in harmony with
the spirit of liberality in which the statute was conceived. Fidelity Co. v.
Commission, I77 Cal. 614 This spirit of liberality is described in Ross v.
Erickson, 8g Wash. 634 where the court said that injustice to the laborer
and hardships to the industries of the state alike called for some plan that
would relieve the servant of the necessity of pursuing his remedy in the
courts andl subjecting himself to all the harassments, vexations, and uncertainties attending a trial. The laws are designed to protect the workman,
but the courts will not allow them to be used to mulct the employer and
the public. It is for this reason that vocati9nal diseases are not included
within the statutes, because the cause of the injury is not traceable with
reasonable certainty by any reliable method of proof. To allow such speculative claims would be to encourage fraudulent practices and would contribute to defeating the broad purposes underlying the compensation lay;s.
The question whether the cause of the injury is traceable by any reliable
method of proof should, therefore, determine whether recovery should be
allowed! under the "sustained by accident" clause. It is by this test that it
must be decided whether an unexpected and unintentional injury constitutes
a11 accident or whether actual physical violence is necessary. See I4 Cor..
L. Rr:v. 563, 648.
C. G. B.
LIC'£Nsts-0RDINANCt AUTHORIZING COMMISSIONER TO Rr:voKt SoF'l'
DRINK LictNSE INVALID.-The city of Tacoma passed an ordinance creating
a license department in the department of public safety, which provided
for licensing and regulating soft drink and candy stores. The ordinance
arranged for the means of securing such a license and· then enacted: "Th~
license of any business mentioned in this section may be revoked by the
commissioner of public safety in his discretion for disorderly or 'immoral
conduct or gambling on the premises, or whenever the preservation of public
morality, health, peace or good order shall in his judgment render such revocation necessary. Such revocation. shall be subject to appeal to the city
council, to be prosecuted by filing a written notice with the council within
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ten days after the revocation. Upon receipt of such appeal the council
shall appoint a day for hearing the appeal, giving the appellant at least three
days' prior notice in writing thereof. The decision of the council shall be
final." M, being the possessor of a duly issued license under this ordinance
to carry on the business of selling soft drinks and candy, had established
such a business. The commissioner of public safety, being of the opinion
that the business as conducted by M had become a menace to "the preservation of public morality, health, peace, and good order," assumed to revoke
the license. M challenged the validity of the act. Held, the ordinance is
unconstitutional. State er rel. Makris v. Superior Court of Pierce County,
(Wash., 1920), 193 Pac. &Js.
The court held that the effect of this ordinance was to place in the
hands of the commissioner of public safety, and in turn in the hands of the
city council upon appeal from the commissioner, the arbitrary power, uncontrolled by any prescribed rule of action, to decide who may and who may
not engage in and carry on the lawful business of selling soft drinks in
the city.
It is submitted that from what appears in the report of the case the
decision is wrong. In the lower court a trial was had on the merits, which
resulted in the court denying relief to the plaintiff. It must, therefore,
have been found that the commissioner did not act arbitrarily, and that
he did not discriminate against the plaintiff. The evidence must have satisfied the court that the plaintiff conducted his business in such a way as to
be a menace to "the preservation of public morality, health, peace, and
good order." It is to be noticed that there is no allegation or evidence
that the commissioner acted arbitrarily or with the intention of unjustly
discriminating against the plaintiff.
It is also interesting to notice that the court cites the leading case of
Yick Wo v. Hcpkins, u8 U. S. 356, in support of its decision. This cai;e
is frequently cited by courts and text writers as an authority for the proposition that an ordinance which vests a purely personal and arbitrary power
in the hands of a public official is a denial of due process of law. That
case involved an ordinance which required all persons desiring to establish
laundries in frame houses to obtain the consent of certain officials. Yick
Wo, a· native of China, who had conducted a laundry in a wooden building
for twenty-two years, and who had complied with all existing regulations
for the prevention of fire and the protection of health, was refused such
consent, upon his- application; and he was convicted and imprisoned> for
conducting his laundry without such consent. His petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was denied by the state supreme court and he appealed to
the U.nited States Supreme Court. It is difficult to tell from the report
just what the court decided. There is sonte language in the opinion to
justify the conclusion that the court held the ordinance unconstitutional
on the sole ground of vesting an arbitrary discretion in a public official.
The court says: "The very idea that one man may be compelled to hold
his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoy-
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ment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable m any
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery ibelf."
In regard to the ordinances the court say~ : "They seem intended to confer
and actually do confer, not a discretion upon consideration of the circumstances of each case, but a naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold
consent, not only as to ph~ces, but as to persons. * * * The power given to
them is not confided to their discretion in the legal sense of that term, but
is granted to their mere will. It i~ purely arbitrary, and acknowledges
neither guich!.nce nor restraint."
The effect of the above passage is weakened somewhat as the evidence
in the case showed· that the ordinance in actual operation had been directed
exclusively against the Chinese. The evidence showed "an administration
directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons as to warrant
the conclusion that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinance3
so atlopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their
administration, and thus representing the state itself, with a mind so unequal
and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of that equal
. protection of the law which is secured to the petitioner as to all other
persons by the broad and benign provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The court then goes on to say: "Though the law be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet if it is administered by public authority with
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution."
However, it is submitted that a careful analysis of the case shows that
the court did not declare the ordinance unconstitutional, either because it
vested an arbitrary power in the hands of a public official or because the
evidence showed; a wanton and wilful discrimination by the persons charged
with its administration against a particular class of persons. It merely
decided that the petitioner cot•ld not be punished under the ordinance. But
as the Supreme Court has never been called upon since to determine exactly
what was decided by the court in Yick W o v. Hopkin.~, there must be more
or less speculation about it.
·
Two years before the decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra, the
Supreme Court decided in Barbier v. Connolly, II3 U. S. 27, that an ordinance of the city of San Francisco providing that no person should carry
on the business of a public laundry within certain limits without a certificate from the health officer, and another certificate from the Board of Fire
Wardens, was valid. The Ccnnecticut court in E; parte Fiske, 72 Conn.
125, reconciles these cases by saying : "A correct understanding, however,
of the extent to which that case goes (Yick Wo v. Hopkins) can be ha<l
only by considering that the proof, which the court looked into, showed
that the ordinance there under review was so administered as to exclude
the subjects of the emperor of China, and no others, from the business of
keeping a laundry. • • * It is evident from the language that the decision
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rested mainly upon the admitted discrimination against. a class of persons
in the public administration of the ordinance. The decision, therefore, as
an authority, goes no further than to hold that, under a state of facts similar in character to the facts of that case, an ordinance similar in character
.to th!! one there passed on would be invalid."
There are no such facts in the principal case. There is no evidence
that there was any discrimination in the administration of the ordinance
against the plaintiff. On the contrary, the case was tried on its merits, and
the trial court refused to grant the plaintiff any relief. It is true that under
the ordinanc~ in question the commissioner is given considerable disi:retion
in determining what was a menace to "the preservation of public morality,
health, peace, and good order." But could the legislature prescribe a more
definite rule of action? It seems obvious that the legislature could not
define all the circumstances and conditions which would be a menace "to
the preservation of public morality, health, peace. and good order." It seems
that in the very nature of things the determination of what conditions
come within the general rule must be left to an administrative officer.
The cases are in conflict on this questfon of the validity of statutes and
ordinances conferring unrestrained discretion. Many courts have upheld
ordinances similar to the one in the principal case. In Wilso~ v. Eureka
City, 173 U. S. 3z, the court upheld an ordinance which forbade any person
mov~g a frame building owned by him without the written permission of
the mayor. The court approves the summary of cases in Re Flaherty, 105
Cal. 558, in which unrestrained discretion is sustained, and declare that discretion;;iry power is "based on the necessity of the regulation of rights by
uniform and general laws-a necessity which is no better observed by a
discretion in a board of aldermen or council of a city than in a mayor."
In Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, it was held that no relief could
be granted against a law merely because it confers a discretion readily susceptible of abuse, if no actual discriminato.ry administration is shown. In
People v. Von De Corr; 19') U. S. 552, after citing a number of cases sustaining a delegation of discretion to a board, the court says: "These cases
leave in no doubt the proposition that the conferring of discretionary power
upon administrative boards to grant or withh~ld permission to carry on a
trade or business which js the proper subject of regulation within the police
power of the state is not violative of rights .sc:cured by the Fourteenth
Amendment. There is no presumption that the power
be arbitrarily
exercised, and when it is shown to be thus ~erciscd against the individual,
under sanction of state authority, this court has not hesitated to interfere
for his prqtection, when the case has come before it in such manner as to
authorize the interference of the federal court," citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
supra. In Davis v. M ossachusett.r, l(Q U. ·s. 43, an ordinance of the city of
Boston providing that "no person shall, in or upon any of the public grounds,
make any public address," etc., "except in accordance with a permit from
the mayor," is· valid. ThC£e cases would seem to indicate that the Supreme
Court of the United States is committed to the doctrine that administrative
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officers may be given discretionary power to act according to their own
unrestricted judgment, and that an ordinance or law granting this authority
is not, uj)on its face, void. In Commissioners of Eaton v. Covev, 74 Md. 262,
an ordinance was sustained requiring a permit from the commissioners for
the erection of a building in the city; in Kessinger v. Hay, 52 Tex. Civ.
App. 295, 113 S. W. 1005, an. ordinance was upheld requiring hackmen to
secure a license to use the streets as a public stand, reserving to the municipal authoriti"es the discretion to say who shall and who shall not have permits; in Es parie Bogle (Tex.), 179 S. W. u93, an ordinance giving- the
city authorities discretionary power to grant or refuse a license for operating
a jitney was upheld; in Laurelle v. Bush, 17 Cal. App. 409, 119 Pac. 953, an
ordinance giving tbe police commissioner power to grant or refuse a permit
to operate a moving picture show was upheld, although it did not pr~scribe
methods for its application. The court said : "It is a w.ell recognized :rule
of statutory construction that a general grant of power, unaccompanied by
specific direction as to the manner in which the power is to be exercised,
implies a right and a duty to adoi;;t and employ such means and methods as
may be reasonably necessary to a proper exercise of the power. * * * Tested
by this rule, it cannot be said that the board of police commissioners is
vested with an undefined" and whimsical discretion in the matter of granting
or refusing a permit."
Not every act giving an arbitrary discretion to an administrative officer
should be upheld, but in passing upon questio~s of this character practical
considerations and the necessity ,of administrative efficiency should be considered. In these days, when the extent of governmental functions has
become so great and complicated, it seems that about all the legislature can
do is to declare the general policy of the law, and leave its enforcement and
applicatjon to the discretion of some official. It is presumed such discretion
will be exercised Jtonestly. It seems reasonable that the courts should interfere with the exercise of such discretion only when it is alleged and proved
that this discretion has been abused. See IQ MxcH. L. Rsv. 211; also, FR!tUND,
Pou~ Powo, Secs. 642-655.
A. G. B.

